0day is cool. Killing 0day, sight unseen, at scale — that’s cooler.
If you agree with me, you might be my kind of defender, and the upcoming O’Reilly Security Conference(s) might be your kind of cons.
Don’t get me wrong. Offense is critical. Defense without Offense is after all just Compliance. But Defense could use a home. The Blue Team does not always have to be the away team.
So for quite some time, I’ve been asking Tim O’Reilly to throw a highly technical defensive security event. Well, be careful what you wish for. I actually keynoted his Velocity event with Zane Lackey a while back, and was struck by the openness of the environment, and the technical competence of the attendees. This is a thing that would be good for Defense, and so I’ve taken the rare step of actually joining the Program Committee for this one, CFP’s for NYC & Amsterdam are still open (but not for much longer!). How would you know if this is your sort of party?
NIST’s SAMATE project has been assembling this enormous collection of minimized vulnerability cases. They’re just trying to feed static analyzers, but if you’re filled with ideas of what else is possible with these terabytes of goodies – this is your con.
Researchers at Stanford instrumented the IDE’s of students, and watched how early failures predicted later ones. Can we predict the future authorship of security vulnerabilities? In what ways do languages themselves predict failures, independent of authors? If this interests you, this is your con.
If you’re in operations, don’t feel left out. You’re actually under attack, and you’re actively doing things to keep the lights on. We want to know how you’re fighting off the hordes.
We live in a golden age of compilers actually trying to help us (this was not always the case). Technologies like Address Sanitizer, Undefined Behavior Sanitizer, Stack Protection / /GS along with the Microsoft universe of Control Flow Guard and the post-Boehm-ish MemGC suggest a future of much faster bug discovery and much better runtime protections. Think you’ve got better? Think you can measure better? Cool, show us.
Or show us we’re wrong. Offensive researchers, there are better places for you to demonstrate the TLS attack of the hour, but if you haven’t noticed, a lot of defensive techniques have gotten a “free pass”, E for effort, that sort of thing. There’s a reason we call ‘em sandboxes; they’re things kids step into and out of pretty freely. Mitigations not living up to their hype? Security technologies actually hosting insecurity? Talk to a bunch of people who’d care.
We’re not going to fix the world just by blowing things up. Come, show us your most devious hacks, let’s redefine how we’re going to defend and fix the Internet.