Wu Dahui, a former military researcher now at Tsinghua University in Beijing talks about how the lack of infantry(and manpower overall) affected russian operations in Ukraine. Surely some people in China will argue that despite the focus of the modernization of the PLA being more directed to the navy and air force, the Ukrainian war supports the case that countries still needs large armies comprised not only of personnel reserves but also of equipments to replace losses.

“The army of a major country must generally maintain a reasonable size, otherwise it will lose its battlefield advantage. The Continental Army has always been Russia’s strategic tradition and military advantage. When the Ukrainian crisis broke out, the Russian Army had only 280,000 soldiers, and only 160,000 contracted soldiers could be used for overseas operations. However, the Ukrainian crisis is a large-scale conventional war on Ukraine’s 600,000 square kilometers of land. The limited size of the Russian Army makes it impossible to apply the three-dimensional combat and both offensive and defensive capabilities emphasized in its army doctrine. After learning from the pain, Russia recruited another 300,000 people to participate in the war against Ukraine through partial mobilization, and considered expanding the army to 1.5 million, of which contract soldiers may account for 50% of the total. The core of this Russian military reform is to increase infantry combat power.

The Ukrainian crisis not only affects international security, politics, and economy, but also deeply affects the trend of major power military reforms. Both Russia and Ukraine and other parties involved in the conflict adapt to war in war and learn war in war. The world’s major powers also regard this conflict as a “living example” of national defense modernization.
Since the end of the Cold War, major powers in the world have optimized the structure of their army in the new military reforms, and army building needs to anchor a strong opponent most, otherwise the goal of army building will be lost.

From Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union, Russia has always anchored a clear opponent and used this as a driving force to build a powerful army. Prussia/Germany and Turkey were regarded as the primary threats by Tsarist Russia at different historical periods. In the process of competing with these land powers for hegemony, the Tsarist Russian government always regards building a powerful army as its top priority. In the nearly two centuries from the coronation of Peter the Great in 1721 to the abdication of Nicholas II in 1917, the size of the Russian army ranked first in Europe for one and a half centuries. In the rest of the time, the size of the Russian army has never fallen out of the top three in Europe. Due to inferior weapons and equipment to Western countries, and the national military strategy is mainly based on external expansion, Tsarist Russia often uses the scale advantage of the army to compete with opponents or opponent alliances.

During the Soviet period, in response to the joint armed intervention of 14 early Allied Powers with a total force of 1.3 million, the Army quickly expanded to 3 million. After the outbreak of World War II, in order to fight against Nazi Germany, the Soviet Army once expanded to about 10 million people. For a long time after the war, in order to fight against NATO led by the United States, even after possessing the Trinity nuclear force, the size of the Soviet Army was maintained at two to three million people all the year round. In 1988, the Soviet Army still had 1.99 million people.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, during most of Yeltsin’s administration, Russia tried to integrate into the West and no longer anchor the United States as a competitor. In order to show favor to the West, Yeltsin took the initiative to disarm, and the army was the first to bear the brunt, and the number was quickly reduced to less than 600,000. For most of the time after Putin came to power, due to limited financial resources, the Russian military construction pursued the theory of “nuclear weapons first”, and the development of the army ranked last among all services. In the era of easing relations between Russia and the United States, Russia no longer clearly anchors the United States as its primary opponent. After the Russian-Georgian War, the main construction direction of the Russian army was positioned to deal with non-traditional security threats, and the size of the army was further reduced.
The army of a major country must generally maintain a reasonable size, otherwise it will lose its battlefield advantage. Maintaining a strong army has always been Russia’s strategic tradition and military advantage. However, when the Ukrainian crisis broke out, Russia, which has a vast territory of 17 million square kilometers, was only equipped with an army of 280,000 people, and only 160,000 contracted soldiers could be used for overseas operations. During the same period, the U.S. Army plus the National Guard had nearly 800,000 personnel. The Ukrainian crisis is a large-scale regional conventional war on Ukraine’s 600,000 square kilometers of land. The limited size of the Russian Army makes it impossible to apply the three-dimensional combat and both offensive and defensive capabilities emphasized by the Russian Army doctrine.

The army construction of a big country pays attention to the optimization of the structure of arms, otherwise there will be no advantageous conditions for both offense and defense. On the eve of the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the Russian Army built 178 battalion-level battle groups, gradually replacing traditional units such as motorized infantry battalions and mechanized infantry battalions. Each battalion-level battle group consists of 800 to 1,200 people, with the motorized infantry battalion as the core, including self-propelled artillery battalions, tank companies, armor companies, multiple rocket launcher companies, reconnaissance companies, support companies, communication companies and other units. The advantages are strong firepower output, rapid assault advance, and flexible combat mode. The disadvantage is that most of the soldiers are technical soldiers such as gunners, ammunitionists, and tankers. Once casualties occur, it is difficult to quickly replenish soldiers, and the unit’s combat effectiveness drops rapidly. Most of the fighting areas in Ukraine are plains, and tanks and armored vehicles are easy targets for firepower. In addition, the Russian battle group lacks pure infantry. The line of fire once stretched 2,200 kilometers, and urban combat was also very intensive. After the Russian army retreated from Kharkov and Kherson, the front line still has more than 800 kilometers. It is pure infantry, and the main equipment is not suitable for street fighting and competition for buildings one by one.

A country’s army is the last barrier of homeland security and plays an irreplaceable role in safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests. The changes in the situation on the Ukrainian crisis battlefield have highlighted the serious shortage of the Russian army, especially the pure infantry, and it also fully demonstrates that a major country always needs a land combat force with an optimized structure, both offensive and defensive capabilities, and a reasonable scale.

After learning from the pain, Russia recruited another 300,000 people to participate in the war against Ukraine through partial mobilization. These people are mainly pure infantry, which is scarce in the army. Russia is considering expanding the army to 1.5 million, of which contract soldiers may account for 50% of the total. The core of Russia’s military reform is to increase infantry combat power. It is reported that the Russian army will dismantle the Western Military District into the Moscow Military District and the Leningrad Military District, and then form 3 motorized infantry divisions. At the same time, the 7 motorized infantry brigades will be expanded into motorized infantry divisions, and 5 military district-level artillery divisions will be formed separately.

(The author is the deputy dean of the Russian Institute of Tsinghua University, and the article is reproduced from World Knowledge Journal)”!

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Are western countries drawing similar lessons? What are your thoughts?

Source: http://memo.cfisnet.com/2023/0309/1327490.html