Rob Lee posts some comments on an article by the Russian think-tank Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST).

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1658395198790025216.html

The article itself is basically hypothesis about the future of warfare from a Russian perspective. I found it interesting because it does show there is some people thinking about the future and the consequences of the current war. They emphasize the roles of drones and remote guided weapons over mass fires in the future. They suggest that things won’t get back to normal by at least 2028 for the Russian economy. Russian arms exports are suggested to be similarly limited until that time, which will undoubtably come with a loss of future market share.

Here I provide a DeepL translation:

Prospects for Military-Technical Cooperation of Russia in the Light of a Special Military Operation

Despite all recent military-political cataclysms, the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) continues its basic profile, conducting analytical-research work in the field of military-technical cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign countries, as well as in respect to the world market of armaments and military equipment in general. We offer for your attention some excerpts from one of the latest CAST studies with conclusions regarding the prospects of Russia’s military-technical cooperation in the light of the special military operation in Ukraine – both in terms of analysis of changes in the structure of demand in the world defense market and possible Russian offers in this market, and regarding forecasts regarding the functioning of the very mechanism of Russia’s military-technical cooperation in the current stressful military conditions.

The special military operation (SSO) of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine has become a major factor in the domestic and foreign political situation for Russia, and the impact of SSO on the situation in and around the country will only increase. The USO was the largest conventional war on the European continent since 1945 and a radical test of the pre-existing views of the leadership and theorists of the world’s leading armed forces on modern warfare. The USO is accompanied by extensive use of the most modern weapons, as well as weapons that until recently formed the basis of technical equipment of armies of the leading Western and Eastern states. Thus it provides an unprecedented test by real combat experience of all “cross-section” of armament and military equipment (AME) of major military powers, which have entered into service for more than half a century.

Taken together, the SSE thus has and will have in the future the most profound impact on the military construction of all significant countries and, consequently, on the world market for military products (MPP). This will lead, according to our forecasts, to the most serious and sometimes radical changes in the structure of purchases of AME, and thus, the structure of demand for it on the international market.

A peculiarity of combat operations in the course of the CFE was the fairly rapid exhaustion of the parties’ ability to conduct maneuver combat and the transition to positional warfare, which caused talk of a return to “positional stalemate” and “material battles” in the spirit of World War I. It is still unclear whether this trend is typical of the current stage of modern military affairs or reflects the specifics of combat operations in Ukraine. It is not yet clear to what extent this trend is characteristic of the entire current stage of modern military affairs or reflects the specifics of combat operations in Ukraine. It should be pointed out that elements of gravitation toward positional warfare instead of maneuver warfare have been observed more than once during local conflicts in recent decades, especially when one side has no cardinal numerical and/or technological superiority (the most striking example was the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988).

One of the main reasons for this trend is that since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War the vulnerability of the tank on the battlefield has been steadily increasing, which resulted in losing the tank as the major breakout and maneuver tool, and hence in depriving maneuver warfare of its main technical support. It remains to be seen whether increase in tank protection (in the first place through introduction of active protection systems) will change the situation radically. It can be assumed that it will stimulate intensive work on improvement of tanks and intensify the purchase of most modern and advanced tank platforms. The same can be said about the class of light armored vehicles, where advanced platforms will move towards the advanced tanks in terms of protection and other features (and cost).

On the whole, the USO has demonstrated the decisive role of ground troops in the armed struggle, since only the army is capable of occupying and holding territory. At the same time, the use of ground forces requires large quantities of BAT and leads to the expenditure of huge amounts of ammunition. On the other hand, high-precision weapons and high-precision munitions have been shown to be an effective alternative to the massive and costly use of unguided munitions, since the latter is rather a consequence of the low actual military and technical level of both opposing sides. In this connection we can already observe the beginning of a boom in demand for artillery and rocket-artillery systems with high-precision munitions and with increased range and, on the other hand, a return to the mass mobilization stockpile of munitions of all kinds.

Combat experience demonstrates the importance of mass saturation of the troops with tactical-level guided weapons, from modern PTRCs to light barraging ammunition. A tactical missile in the spirit of NLOS and ALAS with a command-guided mode of guidance and increased range, which could in principle take over a significant part of the role of artillery, could become an important promising firepower.

Digitalization and “networking” of the battlefield has become an important aspect of the NWO, providing unprecedented reconnaissance, targeting, command and fire capabilities in real time. Mass application of global data transfer systems, such as Starlink, made it possible to achieve “universal” networking of combat units (down to vehicles and crews), subunits and units. This will lead to further rapid acceleration of the dynamics of implementation in armies of digital ACS and control and communication systems on the basis of global Internet services, both military and “dual purpose”.

In combat use of aviation, the USO has demonstrated the high efficiency of ground-based air defense systems, which led to the actual paralysis of large-scale combat aviation operations over the combat zone and deep in enemy territory. On the other hand, this experience has also pointed to effective ways to neutralize this situation, primarily through extensive use of high-precision weapons, including those with increased range. Thus, we can expect both the growth of demand for modern types of air defense means and explosive introduction and procurement of high-precision aviation weapons of all types and ranges. At the same time, the range of weapons in many cases appears to be a critically important characteristic. The air defense has signed the final verdict on unguided air weapons.

Combat experience has emphasized the importance of survivability of aerial platforms when operating in “contested” airspace, which must be achieved both by improving airborne defense systems and by increasing stealth. In this connection, the opinion of U.S. Air Force experts that current events have demonstrated the obsolescence of all fourth-generation combat aircraft, and that only low-observable fifth-generation fighters are capable of operating effectively in the face of serious opposition from a modern enemy, seems important. Thus, we can expect (and are already seeing) an intensification of the purchase of fifth-generation combat aircraft (and, in the future, sixth-generation) and their replacement with fourth-generation platforms.

The explosive increase in the scale of use of UAVs, especially small ones, demonstrated in the course of the USO should also find a serious development in the form of creation of actually a new huge segment of the market of small UAVs for special military purposes (now almost all this segment is occupied by commercial devices) and small barraging ammunition, which finally turn into standard individual and group weapons of units.

In turn, another colossal fast-developing segment of the market is becoming countermeasures for UAVs of all classes. There is also a rapid evolution of air defense means from classic “anti-self-propelled” combat to counter UAV and bomber ammunition, as well as to the tasks of countering missile and artillery weapons. This poses serious challenges to the development of air defense capabilities, not only in terms of firepower, but also in terms of the cost of hitting the target.

Fleet use in the NWO has been limited, but has demonstrated the crucial nature of coastal missile systems “preventing access” in coastal waters and enclosed seas, as well as the high importance of aviation. This, in our opinion, raises cardinal conceptual questions about the very principles of naval construction in such seas and waters. In essence, we can say that it makes sense to build only such ship platforms that have real combat stability and survivability in such an environment due to powerful air defense and missile defense weapons (i.e. ships of a class no less than “big frigate”).

At sea further development of unmanned strike platforms, both surface and airborne and (in the long term) submarine, which in the future apparently will replace in principle all “small” and light fleet forces, has been shown.

Thus, it is possible to point out that the experience of combat operations in the air force should lead to activation of the global market of land weapons, air defense facilities, long-range high-precision missile weapons (with ranges from operational-tactical, to. potentially, strategic) and unmanned aerial vehicles. Sales of combat aircraft will shift to the segment of fifth-generation fighters, which, given their high cost, will still ensure a large share of aircraft platforms in the world market of military equipment.

Assessing the political prospects of Russia’s military-technical cooperation in the light of the USS, it can only be stated that it fully depends on the course of military operations and, accordingly, on Russia’s relations with the West in this context. It can be assumed that having proved unable to implement militarily the maximalist goals of the February 24, 2022 UAS in Ukraine, the Russian supreme authorities are now looking for ways out of the conflict by maintaining and consolidating the territories occupied to date and forcing Ukraine and its Western sponsors to an armistice based on a territorial “status quo”. To do this, Russia needs to effectively extinguish any attempts by the Ukrainian side to retake significant occupied territories and needs to finally move the conflict to a positional phase similar to the 1951-1953 Korean War positional period, while demonstrating to the West that any realistic Western efforts to militarily support Ukraine will not result in a serious change in the established “status quo.” Taking into account the Russian electoral cycle, the Russian authorities will probably try to end the “hot” phase of the conflict in this way on the above grounds by February 2024.

This scenario may be considered today as the most realistically optimistic for Moscow. In this case, it is possible to achieve a kind of truce on the front by spring 2024, followed by a “transition period” phase, when negotiations will be carried out on a kind of peaceful settlement, an integral part of which will be the gradual removal of at least part of the Western sanctions against Russia. Such a “transition” period can be optimistically estimated at a duration of about a year – that is, until spring-mid 2025.

It should be noted that during this period the Russian side will still face both a shortage of materiel for delivery abroad (because most of the materiel produced in the country will be used for accelerated restoration of the potential of the Russian Armed Forces during a possible truce) and accelerated adaptation of the military-technical cooperation system in conditions of restrictions (new payment forms and delivery routes, etc.).

After that it is possible to expect a “post-crisis” period of up to three years, when some sanctions will be lifted, some currency, banking and transport restrictions will be eased, etc. In any case, even under the most optimistic scenarios, we can expect some kind of normalization of Russia’s overall system of foreign trade no earlier than 2027-2028. Only by that time will it be possible, at best, for significant amounts of weapons and military equipment to be supplied abroad, including new models created from experience of combat operations in air defense, and also the beneficial effect of a possible easing of sanctions will be seen. Perhaps, the political pressure of the West on the customers of Russian AME will also weaken.

It should be noted that all these views are based on optimistic for the current Russian authorities hypothetical scenarios, the feasibility of which is not obvious. A more pessimistic scenario assumes that intense hostilities will continue in Ukraine at least until the winter-spring of 2025. Overall, in our opinion, it is still most likely that the West will not agree to any serious settlement with Russia without a withdrawal of the Russian side in Ukraine to the line of February 24, 2022, and this circumstance will determine the dynamics of both the conflict itself and attempts to get out of it.

The copy of the text in Russian is here:

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4689552.html