As this is a translated work I am simply going to copy and paste the introduction, hypotheses and summary with the conclusions in order to avoid error traps in the interpretation and summarization of a translated piece like this.

“How Many Tanks Does Russia Have Left?” The reality of Russian army tank stocks since the outbreak of the invasion of Ukraine

DISCLAIMER

The Action Resilience Institute aims to help understand the phenomena of political violence and wars in an interconnected and globalized world.

The Institute’s analysis notes therefore include an observation and a perspective of complex phenomena, which may concern the security or resilience of France and Europe.

The sole objective of this note is to deliver qualitative analyzes in order to help understand the phenomena and to have the means to fight against informational actions seeking to influence perceptions.

Finally, the conclusions of this note must be understood as trends and hypotheses and not as scientifically proven findings.

This note follows on from the previous Analytical notes which can be downloaded free of charge from the site http://institutactionresilience.fr

Introduction

Russia claims to have huge stockpiles of tanks

As of February 24, 2022, Russia’s tank stocks were at immense quantities. According to the IISS (official figures from 2017-2022), there would be around 17,500 tanks in reserve. Very early on, these figures were questioned in that these tanks were often stored in the open and could be in poor condition. The Russian army can however count on this stock of gear that can serve as “spare parts reservoirs” to keep the gear in unit in working order

Figures based on the entire USSR’s stockpile rather that the reality of the Russian army.

These figures are mainly taken from counts made during the Soviet period. Thus, a large part of these evaluations are based on a theoretical total of tanks produced by the USSR. The break-up led to some of these tanks ending up under a flag other than Russian.

The Kazakh, Belarusian and Ukrainian armies have inherited a significant number of Soviet tanks.

More recent evaluations still give a stock of nearly 6,000 tanks. this figure remains theoretical since among these thousands of machines, not all are equal in terms of availability.

The objective of this report is to seek to assess the real and mobilizable stocks of Russia, beyond theoretical or propaganda figures, from an in-depth study of available open sources, in order to answer the following question:

Does Russia have stocks of tanks as big as it claims?

The 3 Scenarios Considered

SCENARIO 1: CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT PACE

Scenario #1: Continued Losses

This scenario would see the continuous depletion of the T-72 tank fleet and the gradual decline of the T80 tank fleet, fueled by modernizations and repairs carried out by manufacturers. T-62 tanks would overtake the T-72s from next year due to the revitalization of existing stock removed from reserve bases.

Subject to the preservation of the committed units and the maintenance of the industrial capacity to provide around a hundred units per year, the T-90 tank fleet will continue its transition towards the T90M modernization and constitute the elite segment of the force. Russian [armor].

In the overall trend of the fleet, and without taking into account the need to reserve a repair capacity for existing and surviving models, the fleet of Russian tanks at T+12 months would be at 500 units at +/- 20%, i.e. between 400 and 600 copies. This scenario would therefore lead Russia to an almost total inability to deploy more than one armored brigade in a border theater of operations. Knowing that Russia must keep the borders facing the Baltic countries, Finland, Kazakhstan and China.

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SCENARIO 2: SUCCESSFUL UKRAINIAN OFFENSIVE

Scenario #2: Successful Ukrainian Offensive

This scenario would see the destruction at an accelerated pace of the remaining and in-service tank fleet. All models would be impacted except for corporate preservation measures (strategic retreat). The entire active fleet, all models combined, would become symbolic at the end of 2023 with a total fleet of nearly 250 tanks, each model of tank would therefore be present in a sample quantity (about 1 or 2 battalions) in the Russian ground forces, which complicates the constitution or reconstitution of a large coherent unit such as an armored division.

The absence of an active heavy armored force would mechanically lead to a purely defensive configuration of Russian ground forces not only in Ukraine but also on the borders of the Federation.

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SCENARIO 3: STAGNATION OF THE FRONT

Scenario #3: Stagnation of the front

This scenario would see the survival of the tank fleet and the beginning of a revitalization of the armored personnel, allowing the Russian armed forces to regenerate their fleet with standard delivery rates. Nevertheless, this regeneration would be extremely gradual and would not allow the recovery of levels equivalent to those before the invasion.

The T-72 tank fleet would be able to grow as the T-80s gradually ramped up, the gradual conversion of the T-90 fleet to the M standard would continue to build the elite armored force. Russia would be able to re-establish a large decision-making armored unit from the year 2024.

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SUMMARY OF THE THREE HYPOTHESES

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The various scenarios studied highlight the following characteristics:

• The Russian defense industry is still capable of producing tanks but at an insufficient rate to make up for the losses, a successful Ukrainian offensive would be catastrophic for the operational tank fleet.

• Russia still has a substantial reserve of tanks even if the latter will have to do the work of a major renovation and revitalization project.

• The quality aspect of the tanks put into service or returned to service is decreasing while the Russian defense industry is struggling to find substitute components of equivalent quality to the Western components used in Russian tanks

• A major but determining unknown concerning the availability of vehicles, out of nearly 1300 tanks in theoretical strength, a large part requires repairs at mid-life due to the intensive use made during the 15 months of conflict and the damage suffered during the operations.

CONCLUSIONS:

On the Defense Industry

Regarding the Russian defense industry, if the Ministry of Industry has announced a quadrupling of production figures, these statistics most likely include modernizations and repairs of tanks in the factory. In fact, these projections are consistent with the total theoretical capacities for the production of new vehicles, the modernization of existing ones and the repair and refurbishment of the tanks present in the storage bases, i.e. a “produced” workforce of between 700 and 800 tanks.

This make-up of statistics to inflate production figures is not new and already during the Second World War, Albert Speer had already used this method of raking tanks in modernization/repair (for example Panzer III and IV): even repairs minor were included in the production statistics.

On the Remaining Reserves

Although the stocks are still substantial, the probability for the tanks stored to be operational is diminishing while the tanks stored in dry air have already been massively removed to make up for the losses of the year 2022. The next tanks removed will have a lot more chance of having to go through a factory repair phase and therefore mechanically having to be immobilized for 3 to 4 months, taking into account the transport from the storage bases, the factory repair, and the shipment to an operational unit . This delay remains a minimum delay and does not take into account the existing queue at the entrance to the manufacturing or tank repair factories.

These queues were observed in November 2022 at the Omsktransmash plant where nearly 100 T-62 tanks are awaiting modernization. In May 2023, the line has grown further and nearly 200 tanks are present awaiting repair or modernization.

On the Qualitative Aspect of the Armaments Produced or Modernized

A decrease in the quality of the armaments was noted on the last specimens delivered, thus, the sights of tanks of last generation gave way to analogical thermal sights resulting from the Soviet era. The tanks rehabilitated are increasingly old: examples of T-62, T-55 and T-54 have been observed in the theater of operations, the first versions of the T-72 have also been seen in Ukraine.

As Russia uses up the stocks present in the repair bases, the level of performance and overall availability of the equipment will decrease. Already victims of an omnipresent cannibalism, the periods of reconditioning of the tanks will lengthen or will be incomplete in relation to the standard versions (absence of certain optics, absence of telemetry, absence or deficiency of the stabilizer of fire, breakdown of the automatic loader, engine or transmission underperformance and many other problems).

Hardware Availability

These weaknesses in the availability of a coherent mass for the whole of the Ukrainian theater underlines a low rate of availability of equipment, complicated by the diversity of models of combat tanks used on the front, and which has been further accentuated with the mobilization of older models. The proliferation of different models has the effect of expanding the existing base of maintainers and specialists needed to carry out vehicle maintenance and repair tasks. While the industrial defense apparatus is having difficulty finding personnel, this situation will degrade the general availability of the fleet as new tank personnel attempt to make up for the losses incurred during the previous year.

Tanks restored to operational condition of increasingly older models, requiring increasingly long lead times, which will increase the load on the factories

Although the estimated volumes of the armored force are still substantial, the availability of equipment is reduced due to the conduct of a war. Difficult to assess exactly, this availability can be assessed with regard to the deployments of armored units on the front. Signs such as the consistency of formed armored units are good qualitative indicators of the general availability of the tank fleet. A very good example was the heterogeneous composition of the tank units engaged during the failed offensive on Vuhledar in January-February 2023. No less than 7 different variants of tanks, in minimal quantities each, were engaged in this critical operation for the restoration of an important axis of communication for the Russian forces in Ukraine. Comparatively more consistent sets were seen on the Svatove and Bakhmut front with company-sized units with only one or 2 models and logistical consistency (same motorization).

Comparatively more consistent sets were seen on the Svatove and Bakhmut front with company sized units with only one or 2 models and logistical consistency.

These weaknesses in the availability of a coherent mass for the whole of the Ukrainian theater underlines a low rate of availability of equipment, complicated by the diversity of models of combat tanks used on the front, and which has been further accentuated with the mobilization of older models. The proliferation of different models has the effect of expanding the existing base of maintainers and specialists needed to carry out vehicle maintenance and repair tasks. While the industrial defense apparatus is having difficulty finding personnel, this situation will degrade the general availability of the fleet as new tank personnel attempt to make up for the losses incurred during the previous year.

Prospects for the Russian Ground Forces

Continued degradation under Ukrainian military pressure has the potential to bring Russian ground forces to breaking point. The current low availability of tanks prohibits any serious offensive against the Ukrainian army, thus explaining the largely defensive posture of the current Russian system.

Although the study focuses on the fleet of Russian ground forces main battle tanks, the same trends (old equipment transported to the front, mosaic of vehicle models, availability problems) were observed in the combat vehicle segment infantry and armored personnel carriers. These elements are so vital in order to accompany the combat tank force in a mechanized offensive.

The continuous degradation of the Russian army is global: loss of human know-how and material capacities

Without an exact knowledge of the vehicle readiness rate, it is difficult to reliably project the breaking point of Russian armor strength. Nevertheless, this force very likely entered a zone of tension, preventing any serious initiative on the part of this force.

What remains certain is that a continued effort of attrition, destruction of field logistics and artillery reduction by Ukrainian forces will bring Russian forces closer to breaking point.

This pressure must remain continuous in order to prevent any reconstitution of a park of tanks which could be able to carry out an offensive. While the level of technology will most likely not match that of the initial invading forces, the mace can pose a threat if it catches the Ukrainian Armed Forces off guard.

The current low availability of tanks prohibits any serious offensive against the Ukrainian army