Hubris’ Downfall: The Hard Road Ahead for the Russia-Ukraine War

by Robert David English

The article is simple in its message – like so many times before, in so many wars before – we are being lied to. Lied that the enemy is failing, lied that his army is falling apart, demoralised, inept, incompetent, that they are fighting with rusty Mosin-Nagants, blowguns and sharp kiwis, that they can’t resist the sheer awesomeness of our high-tech, shiny toys. “Haven’t they heard we won the war – what do they keep on fighting for?”. But, back to the summary of Mr English’s article:

– The wages of hubris are dear.

– The cost of the counteroffensive is massive, 20,000 casualties for 100 sq miles. The economic burden is growing.

– Yet officials in Brussels and Washington insist that Kyiv’s counteroffensive is succeeding, cheering minor advances and illusory breakthroughs. Retired military officers exaggerate Russia’s military weakness, seeing victory as one more game-changing weapon transfer away.

– “Minefields and trenches” is the excuse we are offered for the stalled offensive – neglecting to admit that Russia is fighting fiercely with both tactical and technological prowess.

– We underestimated the adversary, leading to flawed tactics, failed operations, and now flagging public support. What next? As always, the default choice is escalation—providing Kyiv with more armaments and munitions.

– The Crimean Bridge has symbolized Russian resourcefulness in the face of Western scorn for a decade – first, they lacked the know-how to build it, then it was supposed to collapse under its own weight, and now for the second time it is being repaired despite triumphant “severe blows” to “the vital supply line”.

– Media experts—often the same ones who predicted rapid progress—now explain why progress could never have been rapid in any case.

– The Ukrainians press on, their courage under fire reverently detailed in the media. But that of the Russians—also fighting fiercely and taking heavy losses—is nowhere to be seen.

– Is the aim of war reporting to celebrate one’s allies? Or is it to present a balanced assessment, regardless of whether the good or bad guys have the upper hand?

– Many analysts remain bullish on Ukraine’s eventual victory, yet now see it resulting from a Russian collapse—whether of the Russian army or the entire Putin regime. In other words, these military experts base their prognoses not on analysis of military operations per se but on hunches about the perseverance and patriotism of Russian soldiers and citizens.

– When facing a tough situation, our leaders start to spin:

– U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently defended Ukraine’s counteroffensive: “They (Russia) have already lost,” and “(Ukraine) has already taken back about 50 percent of what was initially seized.” Yet the entire point of this year’s campaign is to retake the other 50 percent.

– ISW claimed that Ukraine regained more territory in under six weeks than Russia in the previous six months. Instead of assessing Kyiv’s campaign by its stated objective—a rapid thrust to sever Russia’s land bridge with Crimea.

– People fall victim to confirmation bias—finding evidence of Russian weakness because their assumptions told them to seek it.

– Selective coverage is also prevalent: many examples of reporting of Moscow’s “desperation” in seeking an arms deal with North Korea. Yet they simultaneously ignored signs of “desperation” in Kyiv, such as lowering fitness standards for military service or seeking to deport back to Ukraine men who are ducking conscription in countries of the EU.

– Cheerleading that “Ukraine must win decisively, and with superior NATO armaments, it surely will” supports neither sensible military strategy nor responsible policy debate.

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Robert English, a former Pentagon policy analyst, is the Director of Central European Studies at the University of Southern California. He is the author of various works on the Cold War’s end and aftermath, including Russia and the Idea of the West.

Research & Practice AreasInternational foreign policy & defense analysis; Regional studies – Russia, the former USSR & Eastern Europe

Education

Ph.D. politics, Princeton University, 1/1995

M.P.A. international relations, national security, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 6/1982

B.A. history/Slavic studies, University of California, Berkeley, 6/1980

Summary Statement of Research Interests

Professor English studies Russia, the former USSR, and Eastern Europe, with a focus ranging from general issues of regional relations to specific questions of ethnicity, identity, and nationalism. He is presently working on a book-length study entitled Our Serbian Brethren: History, Myth, and the Politics of Russian National Identity. He formerly worked as a policy analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense and the Committee for National Security.

Honors & Awards

Recipient of National or International Prize in Discipline, Marshal Shulman Prize, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 2001

Recipient of National or International Prize in Discipline, Harold D. Lasswell Prize, American Political Science Association, 1996