https://www.stratagem.no/russian-threat-perception-the-case-of-empty-borderlands-and-the-risk-of-russian-pre-emptive-attacks/

Osflaten argues that

a) The main danger of Russia’s attack on NATO is now, not in the future. The level of danger hinges on Russia’s perception that a NATO attack is inevitable – in that case, they are likely to pre-empt.

b) They have the forces to do so since they can transition to defence in Ukraine and free up to 500,000 troops.

c) Western analysts are wrong on two counts – believing that Russia’s withdrawal of troops from NATO borders means Russia does not fear a NATO attack, and believing that the main Russian threat is some future salami-slice attack on small NATO member states following the war in Ukraine.

• The claim that NATO posed no serious threat to Russian Federation in early 2022 (based on Russia having pulled many ground forces from its borders to invade Ukraine) rests on flawed assumptions.
• Russia’s leadership apparently calculated that concentrating forces for Ukraine, while leaving borderlands “lightly defended,” was a tolerable risk in order to maximise war-fighting capacity elsewhere.
• Those Western assumptions overlook how Russia thinks about security: their threat perception does not prioritise a conventional NATO ground invasion, but rather other types of (NATO) threats.
• Specifically, Russian doctrine views “subversive methods” (e.g. “colour revolutions,” internal destabilisation, Trojan-horse infiltration) as a key way the West might threaten Russia – far more salient than a traditional land invasion.
• Another core concern for Moscow: a surprise NATO strike using long-range precision weapons (missiles, airpower, cyber-enabled disruption) aimed at disarming Russia before a full-scale war even begins.
• From that perspective, ground forces garrisoned at the border are not the main line of defence. Rather, Russia relies on strategic reserves, long-range strike capability, mobility, and readiness to respond – or pre-empt – before a perceived threat materialises.
• The article argues that Russia’s strategic culture and doctrine emphasise “forecasting, strategic surprise and pre-emption” – meaning if Kremlin leadership perceives a growing threat from NATO or the West, they might strike first rather than wait.
• That mindset makes the present (not “some years into the future”) potentially the most dangerous moment for a major confrontation between Russia and NATO, especially if Russia concludes war is inevitable.
• The so-called “empty borderlands” (regions near NATO territory where Russia moved forces away) should not be interpreted as evidence that Russia no longer fears NATO – rather, it reflects a reassessment of what “threat” means in Russian strategic thinking.
• The article warns that underestimating Russia’s willingness to pre-empt undermines strategic stability: policymakers must consider that Russia might act not from expansionism but from defensive fear – and perhaps strike first if they believe preemption is needed.
• In that sense, Western analysts and policymakers who interpret Russia’s posture purely through traditional conventional warfare logic risk missing the real danger: surprise, asymmetric and hybrid warfare rooted in Russia’s version of “self-defence.”

Major Amund Osflaten (b. 1980) is a teacher in military theory and doctrines at the Norwegian Military Academy.

He has conducted a PhD at King’s College London on the Russian way of regular land warfare after the Cold War. He has achieved a master’s degree in peace and conflict studies and a bachelor’s degree in international studies from the University of Oslo. In addition to a bachelor’s degree in military studies from the Norwegian Military Academy, Osflaten has been serving in a broad range of positions in the Norwegian Army.