https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9HGQqPwbsyo

As is typically the case, Kofman is initially shy about making pronouncements about what the future of the Ukraine-Russia war might herald. Rather, this is a retrospective of what happened over the first few months of the war. If you want to skip Kofman’s retrospective of the war to date, you can skip ahead to 28:00. There’s about an hour of Q&A after the talk, starting at 36:30 (so yes, he only talks about the current situation for 8 minutes). The Q&A contains more speculation about how the future of the war might evolve.

General highligts from the talk:

• Kofman gives credit to HIMARS’ M31 while typically he’s been fairly dismissive of wunderwhaffe. Does try and stress that the ‘software’ part of a military aparatus is more/as important as the ‘hardware’ part like HIMARS. Software in this case means doctine and operations methology.
• Fairly caustic comments about Russian devoting its main effort to Bahkmut which he considers to be of little strategic significance.
  • Bahkmut is important in terms of political symbolism.
• Stresses that the formations NATO has trained have received very abbreviated training and are not combat tested.

From the Q&A:

• Reinforces that he thinks Putin believes this is a contest of wills between him and the West. Points out that great power leaders prefer to think about cases where their nation overcame great odds (e.g. “Great Patriotic War) and ignore those where they lost.
  • Probably the Russian military won’t be able to reform itself until Putin has left power. They are currently moving away from the Western model and towards the Soviet model. Kofman thinks this will fail because fundementally Russia is not the Soviet Union and lacks all of the USSRs strengths.
• Rambling question about peace process. Dismisses it due to the evidence uncovered of Russian war crimes in Bucha making the peace process null and void.
• What assumptions did Kofman have to update after visiting Ukraine in person? Suggests that following the war on Twitter and assuming it’s giving you an accurate representation is about a credulous as watching Lord of the Rings and believing it’s a documentary. There is a big missing observation problem.
• Q about Russia coup-proofing policies. Says there was some return to the political commissar model but that’s not the cause of Russian planning failures for the war. However, reinforces that political loyalty trumped competance for promotions in the Russian high command. The lack of punishment for poor performance in the Russian high command is part of why they have failed.
• What is the threshold for success by the Ukrainian offensive for Russia to recognize that it’s lost?
• What is the strategic goals of Russia? Initial goal was to install a Russian-friendly regime in Kyiv to create a political union between Russia, Ukraine, and Blyeorussia. Compares the unrealistic Russian goals to those of Bush in Iraq. Thinks the current goal is to annex the territory they have now and destroy Ukraine as viable state.
• Another rambling question about the division between Wagner and MoD (some people don’t understand how to pose a question without trying to impose their own views). Stresses that Wagner is two different groups: professional contractors and convicts. Does think the Russian military was sabatoging Wagner. Compares the current Russian forces to the White Russians during their civil war post-WW1.
• Effect of sanctions. Says the price caps have been the biggest problem and that’s a relatively recent. Says sanctions are a form of excommunication from the global economy but it takes years to see the effect.