A Compendium of Troika Observations on Russia’s Special Military Operation

Background

This project began as the vision of General Christopher Cavoli when he was the Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (CG, USAREUR-AF). He realized that the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) assigned to the European theater lacked the detailed understanding of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RF AF) required to advise him and other senior warfighters. During the period from 1991 to 2014, when the United States considered Russia to be a strategic partner, FAO training had shifted its focus away from Russian military capabilities. To address this training gap, GEN Cavoli convened a team of retired Russian-speaking Army FAOs, with a combined total of more than 200 years’ experience working the Russian problem set. We named ourselves “the Troika,” a Russian word rich in history and symbolism. GEN Cavoli directed us to create a training course for FAOs focused on the RF AF at the operational and tactical levels. This course became the Russian Way of War (RWOW) Flagship.

Summary

1. Command & Control

• Russian command is highly centralised and reliant on formal structures and detailed staff work.

• Lacks a flexible NCO corps; small-unit leadership is weak.

• Operational plans rely on “decision maps” rather than mission orders.

• Commanders often lack initiative; many failures traced to rigid doctrine and poor preparation.

• Rampant corruption has undermined control and logistics.

• Despite setbacks, the Russian military is adaptive and continues to evolve.

1. Movement & Maneuver

• Russian forces initially attempted deep thrusts into Ukraine but lacked coordination and logistics.

• Shifted over time to smaller, more controlled advances using massed firepower and methodical gains.

• Russian airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units played key roles in early phases, often suffering heavy losses.

1. Intelligence

• Russia’s ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) is often inaccurate or politically manipulated.

• Heavy reliance on signals intelligence and unmanned systems.

• Failures in human intelligence and target assessment contributed to missteps in planning.

1. Fires

• One of Russia’s strongest functions—artillery dominance has been consistently effective.

• Heavy use of rocket artillery, drones for targeting, and electronic warfare to suppress Ukrainian systems.

• Russian fire coordination improved over time, especially in 2023.

1. Sustainment

• Early in the war, logistics collapsed due to overconfidence and lack of preparation.

• Russian military was not ready for sustained combat: ran out of trucks, fuel, spares.

• Recovered by adapting Soviet-style “economy of force” measures, mobilising civilian resources and foreign support (Iran, North Korea).

• Defence industry shifted to 24/7 production; military budget surged to 8.7% of GDP.

1. Protection

• Weak in force protection early in the conflict (e.g., unarmored columns, poor air defences).

• Improved use of camouflage, deception, and entrenchment by mid-2023.

• High officer casualties (over 3,000 confirmed) show failure to delegate leadership effectively.

1. Surpising areas of strength

• Despite initial failures, the Russian military showed a capacity to adapt, which contradicted assumptions of rigidity.

• Russia surprised analysts with the speed at which it adopted drones.

• The defence industry rapidly switched to wartime footing, exceeding expectations.

• Russia demonstrated unexpected political and military will to absorb heavy losses.

Authors

Managing Editor and Co-Author: COL (Ret) Ted Donnelly

Co-Author: BG (Ret) Kevin Ryan

Co-Author: COL (Ret) Tom Butler

Co-Author: COL (Ret) Jeff Hartman

Co-Author: COL (Ret) Lee Gabel